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PERSPECTIVAL SKEPTICAL THEISM 
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge 
 
Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of 
epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist 
understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, 
yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the 
evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that 
someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not 
subject to closure of inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief 
that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.  
 
The strongest versions of the argument from suffering have been primarily cast in an evidential form.i 
That is, they have been crafted in such a way as to hinge on the mere weighing of evidence. Although this 
might appear innocuous at first glanceii, it is not as innocent as it seems. For the reasonability of 
believing a proposition (e.g. that gratuitous suffering exists) plausibly depends on more than merely 
evidential matters. It also depends importantly on non-evidential, but still epistemic, factors that can 
vary significantly from agent to agent. Such factors include, for instance, an agent’s degree of epistemic 
self-trust or the degree of risk they are willing to take on in pursuit of the truth and avoidance of error. 
This focus on merely evidential considerations has trickled down to the epistemic assumptions 
involved in responses to the argument from suffering as well. And nowhere is this more apparent than 
in the models of skeptical theism found in current literature. Given that skeptical theism aims to 
undermine the reasonability of believing that there are gratuitous evils, and given further that one’s 
reasonability in believing something depends on more than merely evidential considerations, one 
would expect skeptical theism to (sometimes) take on more than a merely evidentialistiii form. 
One recent contributioniv to the skeptical theistic literature has provided the beginnings of a 
framework for developing just such a version of skeptical theism. It does so by suggesting that 
skeptical theism be wedded to a perspectivalist account of epistemic rationality, but this suggestion is 
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made without much by way of further elaboration concerning what such a view might look like in full. 
It is the purpose of this essay to remove this lacuna by constructing a robust account of a new 
perspectival skeptical theism, as well as to highlight the significant contributions such a view makes to the 
current literature on the argument from suffering. 
I begin in §1 by reintroducing the basic structure of the argument from suffering and skeptical 
theism as a response to it. Upon completing this, I briefly turn in §2 to a distinction between two 
different types of epistemic undercutting defeaters; namely, evidential defeaters and closure of inquiry 
defeaters. Though mildly technical, this digression is necessary for appreciating perspectival skeptical 
theism’s distinctiveness as a version of skeptical theism. Then in §3 I turn to a case from the cognitive 
psychology literature involving empirical studies concerning the selection of applicants for admission 
to medical school. This case is particularly useful for our purposes because it clearly illustrates various 
ways in which a putative undercutting defeater—i.e. of either the evidential or closure of inquiry sort—
might be rationally resolved by agents with different epistemic starting points. More specifically, I 
argue that we can uncover at least six different rational responses to an epistemic defeater provided 
by the claims of the empirical studies under question. Next, in §4 we return once more to skeptical 
theism where I apply what we have learned from the previous two sections. What we again see is that 
for any agent entertaining the theses characteristic of skeptical theism, there are at least six different 
rational ways of resolving the putative defeaters such theses present. Lastly in §5, I reflect on various 
advantages perspectival skeptical theism possesses over alternative forms of skeptical theism and conclude 
that it should play a significant part in conversations about the argument from suffering moving 
forward. Let us begin, then, with an overview of the argument from suffering. 
1. The Argument from Suffering & Skeptical Theism 
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The best version of the argument from suffering of which I am aware proceeds in two parts, 
the first of which can be stated in the following deductive fashion: 
1.   If God exists, then there are no instances of gratuitous suffering. 
2.  There are instances of gratuitous suffering. 
 Therefore, 
3.  God does not exist. 
Now, someone might attack premise 1 for a variety of reasonsv, but this is neither the most 
common response nor the response most relevant to our current concerns. Instead, premise 2 bears 
the brunt of the critical responses historically-speaking since many theists find it difficult at best to 
believe that anyone could reasonably believe premise 2. 
In support of the second premise, however, those advancing this argument from suffering 
might appeal to a principle of commonsense epistemology, such as: 
Phenomenal Conservatism: if it seems to S that p, then S is prima facie justified in believing p.vi 
On the assumption that such a principle is true or rationally endorsed by someone advancing 
the argument from suffering detailed above, one could appeal to a combination of this epistemic 
principle and a particular seeming of some bit of suffering as gratuitous to arrive at a justified belief that 
there are instances of gratuitous suffering. And so long as there are no defeaters that prevent the 
immediate prima facie justified belief from becoming ultima facie justified, it will be reasonable for that 
person to affirm it. 
It is at this point that skeptical theism becomes relevant, for skeptical theism is fundamentally 
at least an endorsement of the claim that there is a putative epistemic defeater for those who might 
otherwise reasonably believe premise 2 of the argument from suffering. That defeater, can be stated 
thusly: 
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Skeptical Theism (ST): human agents are not reliable when it comes to determining 
whether or not a given instance of suffering (or evil) is gratuitous. 
To put it simply, skeptical theists affirm both ST and that someone who reasonably believes 
ST cannot reasonably endorse premise 2 of the evidential argument from suffering. The reason for 
this is that ST undercuts the connection between the evidence one possesses of gratuitous suffering 
(i.e. one’s seemings) and what that evidence had been previously thought to support. Or at least, this 
follows provided that one’s seeming-states as of gratuitous suffering are the only source of evidence 
for premise 2. 
From this brief overview of the argument from suffering, however, it is clear that a completed 
version of skeptical theism requires further elaboration. For the idea of undercutting the connection 
between one’s evidence and what it supports can be spelled out in a number of different ways. And 
since the goal of this paper is to construct a version of skeptical theism that relies on a perspectivalist 
theory of epistemic rationality, let us turn to a brief formal discussion of the two fundamental types 
of epistemic undercutting defeaters involved in such a view. 
2. On Evidential and Closure of Inquiry Undercutting Defeaters 
Undercutting defeaters come in at least two varieties, the first and more familiar of which are 
evidential defeaters. To understand the nature of evidential defeat, let e be one’s evidence concerning p 
whenever the probability of p given e is greater than the probability of p on one’s background evidence 
alone (i.e. Pr[p|e] > Pr[p]). Then we can say that dFull is a full defeater of the evidential support relation
vii 
whenever the probability of p given e & dFull is equal to the probability of p alone (i.e. Pr[p|e & dFull] = 
Pr[p]). We can say that dPartial is a partial evidential support relation defeater whenever the probability 
of p given e & dPartial is greater than the probability of p alone but less than the probability of p given 
e—that is, the following both hold:  
5 
 
i. Pr[p|e & dPartial] < Pr[p|e]  
ii. Pr[p|e & dPartial] > Pr[p]viii 
The other sort of defeater sometimes introduced during discussions of perspectivalist forms 
of epistemic rationality is a closure of inquiry defeater, of which one would say the following, 
Such defeaters…do not affect the evidential support relation at all qua closure of inquiry defeater. 
Rather, they defeat the reasonability of believing some target proposition on the basis of one’s evidence, 
no matter how strong or compelling the evidence.ix, x 
Notice that on this account, closure of inquiry defeaters do not target the evidential support 
relation. Rather, they undermine reasonable belief in a proposition, even if the evidence is very 
compelling. In other words, we can say that whenever dCoI is a closure of inquiry defeater, the following 
will be true: 
iii.  Pr[p|e & dCoI] = Pr[p|e], and  
iv.  Even if Pr[p|e] ≈ 1, p cannot be reasonably believed. 
Now, after distinguishing these two types of defeaters, it is worth pressing further the question 
of why reasonable belief is undermined by these closure of inquiry defeaters. There are at least two 
different contexts from which closure of inquiry defeat might emerge: scenarios in which (i) further 
evidence gathering activities seem likely to make a significant difference to what one’s evidence 
supports or (ii) one’s epistemic self-trust is called into question.xi 
Concerning the latter sort of closure of inquiry defeat that is most relevant for our purposes, it is 
important to note the following: sometimes epistemic defeaters do not undermine the quality of one’s 
evidence, as normally happens in cases involving evidential undercutting defeat. Rather, often 
epistemic defeaters target our ability to assess that evidence, independently of whether or not it is of 
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good quality. When our ability to assess evidence is targeted, rather than the quality of the evidence we 
have, then we find ourselves (potentially) in the possession of a closure of inquiry defeater.xii  
To understand better how these different considerations might play out, we turn to an actual 
case involving evidential and closure of inquiry defeaters and consider how such defeaters might interact 
for reasonable individuals confronted by them. This case is especially helpful for thinking practically 
about how the formal considerations above might look when put in a concrete context involving 
someone thinking seriously about what to do or think in light of the threat of an undercutting defeater. 
Once we have applied the evidential and closure of inquiry defeater distinction in this first case, we then 
turn to see how it might be similarly applied to the case of skeptical theism. 
3. Interviewing Candidates for Medical School: Undermining the Quality of Evidence & the Reliable 
Assessment of Evidence 
In recent years the relevance of certain sorts of heuristics and biases to a theory of rationality 
has come to the attention of epistemologists.xiii While there are a number of different cases that we 
could consider, the following scenario involving the interviewing of medical school candidatesxiv is 
especially illuminating: 
In a wide range of studies, short personal interviews, typically one hour, have been 
proven unhelpful in improving the accuracy of predictions about the future 
accomplishments or behavior of the interviewees. One of the studies involves medical 
school admission committees that conducted personal interviews of applicants to 
supplement statistical and other impersonally gathered data about the applicants 
(MCAT scores, grade point average, class rank, quality of undergraduate institution, 
etc.). The task for the committees was to predict future success in medical school as 
measured by the grades the students would receive…The conclusion of these studies 
7 
 
is that personal interviews do not improve predictions of future accomplishments or 
behavior. They did not help the interviewers identify who would become successful in 
medical school (as measured by grades)…Indeed, far from improving predictive 
performance, the interviews actually worsened the accuracy of the predictions made.xv  
The findings of these studies is not favorable for the continued practice of interviewing 
potential medical school candidates. For clearly, these interviews, when included in the assessment of 
an applicant, have in the past inhibited medical schools from achieving their goal of selecting the 
candidates who would be most successful.xvi Now, suppose that you were required by your superior 
to conduct one-hour interviews for potential medical school students and that you learned of the 
studies described above only after conducting the interviews. Despite this, your supervisor has granted 
you permission to decide how to factor your intuitions concerning each candidate’s potential into your 
overall assessment of them.xvii It is helpful when thinking about a noetic state undergoing this 
progression to represent it as constituted by three basic logical steps: (i) Defeater Admission, (ii) 
Determination of the Defeater-Type, and (iii) Defeater Resolution. We consider these three steps in 
logical sequence. 
First, consider the two different defeaters to which the empirical studies concerning personal 
medical school interviews might give rise. In light of those studies, one might entertain either the 
proposition that the evidence one gains through personal interviews is of a bad quality or the proposition that one’s 
ability to gather and assess evidence gained through personal interviews is unreliable. Notice that both of these 
propositions would be undercutting defeaters if believed by an interviewer, but what is undermined 
by the two propositions is different. In the former case, the evidence is undermined because it is 
identified as plausibly misleading. In the latter case, one’s ability to gather and evaluate evidence is 
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undermined, not the evidence itself.xviii In other words, one is faced with either a putative evidential 
defeater or a putative closure of inquiry defeater (or perhaps even both). 
The point of Defeater Admission comes as a result of the platitude that we shouldn’t believe 
everything we hear, and in particular, not every putative defeater one entertains need be believed. Whether 
or not I believe the propositional defeater under question depends on what else I believe, my epistemic 
risk profilexix, my degree of epistemic self-trustxx, and so on. To apply this to our current scenario 
concerning medical school candidate interviews, suppose that I have a justified belief that any empirical 
studies concerning my reliability in assessing the evidence gathered by means of personal interviews (or the quality of the 
evidence itself) are complete hogwash.xxi We might call such a belief, following Plantingaxxii, a ‘defeater-
deflector’. Maintaining such a belief would, if I am consistent, preclude my also believing the putative 
defeaters of the empirical studies. Thus, before I even begin to consider the defeating potential of any 
putative defeater, that defeater must first avoid deflection by relevant beliefs I already possess.xxiii 
Let us suppose for the sake of continuing with this thought experiment that at least one of the  
putative defeaters have avoided deflection. Thus, the first logical step in the process of defeat has 
concluded and we begin the second step; namely, Determination of the Defeater-Type. At the 
beginning of this second step, then, we are in a position to determine whether the defeater or defeaters 
which we have admitted into our noetic system are either evidential defeaters (i.e. one which is either 
partial or full) or closure of inquiry defeaters. The way in which this step proceeds, however, is fairly 
complicated. In order to bring these complications to the surface, in what follows we survey the 
various combinations of defeater-types along with their correlative Defeater-Resolutions (i.e. step 3). 
We have already seen in our discussion of defeater-deflectors that other beliefs are relevant to 
the admission of a defeater into our noetic system. At this second step, in which we sort out the kind 
of defeater with which we are dealing, other epistemic factors again become relevant to what might 
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happen. Let us consider five different ways in which rational reflection might play out for the medical 
school interviews case during this sorting phase.xxiv That is, let us consider what kind of reflection 
might lead an agent to admit either a closure of inquiry defeater, an evidential defeater, or both. 
Recall that in our thought experiment, you have already interviewed potential medical school 
candidates, and thus, you have evidence concerning who the best candidate is based on those 
interviews as its source. Moreover, prior to considering the implications of these empirical studies, let 
us stipulate that you had determined that Polly was probably the best medical school candidate. And 
now, when you hear these studies, you reason as follows: 
Wow, it seems like these studies could call into question either the status of the evidence I have gathered 
from the interviews or my ability to assess that evidence (or both). However, when I reflect on this 
more carefully, I’m not sure why anyone would think that my evidence is problematic. After all, I simply 
gathered more information about each candidate in a particular setting. So my evidence doesn’t seem 
to be undermined. Despite this, given that I and all other members of my kind are highly fallible in 
tracking what this evidence actually connects to, perhaps I should keep my inquiry open until I can either 
gather more evidence that sufficiently confirms what I already take my current evidence to imply or 
find a further reason to disregard the findings of these studies that are undermining the trust I have in 
myself to assess the evidence at hand. 
This line of reasoning reflects the noetic system of a person dealing with a closure of inquiry 
defeater, for they do not change their assessment of the evidence they have gathered. Instead, they 
simply withhold belief in the proposition supported by their evidence until closure of inquiry reacquires 
rational status. 
But there are other ways of sorting these putative defeaters. For instance, an agent might take 
the studies to render the evidence gathered via personal interviews of medical school candidates as 
merely projective evidence. Such an individual would understand the empirical studies to show that in 
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such interviews we see what we want to see rather than what is actually there. The appropriate response to 
such information is the same as the appropriate response to learning that the map one is following to 
Old Faith in Yellowstone National Park is an outdated map with an incorrectly labeled location for 
Old Faithful. One would simply throw out the map in such a situation, and in the case of the 
interviews, one would simply throw out the evidence one has gathered about the candidates in the 
course of the interviews. And importantly, after one’s evidence has been fully undermined in this way, 
one need not reopen inquiry, but rather, once the change in evidential evaluations has taken place, 
inquiry can be closed. In other words, this describes someone who takes the empirical studies to 
provide a fully undercutting evidential defeater without also acquiring a defeater for closure of inquiry. 
Yet suppose we have someone who similarly understands the evidence gathered via personal 
interviews to be in some important sense projective. However, suppose further that they think this is 
only partially the case. Some of the evidence they have gathered, let’s suppose, is not, to their lights, 
misleading. Such a person might then recalibrate the degree of strength accorded the evidence of 
personal interviews—perhaps only counting it to a slight degree—without disregarding the evidence 
in its entirety. In such a case, then, this person has acquired a partially undercutting evidential defeater. 
Might such a person also acquire a closure of inquiry defeater? Perhaps. Whether or not they 
would acquire such a defeater, for instance, might depend on how epistemically cautious they are. Or 
rather, it might depend on the makeup of their epistemic risk profile. Consider the following case 
from Thomas Kelly that illustrates this point well: 
Suppose that the evidence available to me is just barely sufficient to justify my belief that it will rain 
tomorrow: if the evidence was even slightly weaker than it is, then I would be unjustified in thinking 
that it will rain. Suppose further that you have the same evidence but are slightly more cautious than I 
am, and so do not yet believe that it will rain tomorrow. It is not that you are dogmatically averse to 
concluding that it will rain; indeed, we can suppose that if the evidence for rain gets even slightly 
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stronger, then you too will take up the relevant belief. Is there some guarantee, given what has been 
said so far, that you are being less reasonable than I am? —I doubt it.xxv 
In our case, take two individuals, Judah and Peri, who respond to the empirical studies by 
recalibrating the degree of strength they accord to the evidence of the interviews in precisely the same 
way. However, suppose that Judah is slightly more cautious than Peri, and as a result of recalibrating 
his assessment of the evidence’s strength decides to reopen inquiry concerning the identity of the best 
medical school candidate. Peri, however, still finds the evidence sufficiently compelling after 
recalibration to conclude that Polly is the best candidate. In this instance, then, Peri has only acquired 
a partially undercutting evidential defeater while Judah has acquired in addition a defeater for closure of 
inquiry. 
So it is not too difficult to imagine how someone might reasonably acquire a partially 
undercutting evidential defeater alongside a closure of inquiry defeater. But might someone who has a 
fully undercutting evidential defeater also acquire a closure of inquiry defeater? This combination could 
be reasonable as well. Suppose that you acquire a fully undercutting evidential defeater as described 
earlier, but further suppose that you exhibit some doubt about your belief that the evidence gathered 
during the personal interviews was actually projective. Indeed, you think that the prospect of gathering 
more evidence about the empirical studies themselves might reasonably lead to a defeater-defeater. That is, 
you think further evidence gathering might provide evidence which would undermine the 
trustworthiness of the empirical studies and further cancel out the evidential defeater you have 
acquired from those studies. In such a case, learning of the studies undermines the evidence you have 
gathered via personal interviews, but it also provides a reason to reopen an investigation concerning 
the best way to proceed in gathering evidence. Thus, it seems possible, though admittedly unlikely, 
that someone might rationally acquire both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a closure of inquiry 
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defeater on the basis of these interviews. This concludes our survey of the different rational reactions 
one might have to learning of the contents of these empirical studies. 
What I have just done, then, is provide six different cases of individuals faced with putative 
evidential and closure of inquiry defeaters. Each case was described differently to illustrate how 
differences in one’s epistemic machinery (e.g. epistemic risk profile, degree of self-trust, etc.) make 
possible different rational reactions to the same putative defeaters. Those different reactions included 
(1) denying admission to either defeater full stop, or acquiring…(2) a partially undercutting evidential 
defeater, (3) a fully undercutting evidential defeater, (4) a closure of inquiry defeater, (5) both a partially 
undercutting evidential defeater and a closure of inquiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential 
defeater and a closure of inquiry defeater.xxvi 
In the next section, we apply what we have learned to the question of skeptical theism. As 
becomes clear, changes to one’s theory of epistemic defeat, including but not limited to the addition 
of closure of inquiry defeaters, have significant implications for the merits of skeptical theism as a 
response to the argument of evil. We shall see, in fact, that there is a plurality of reasonable responses 
to skeptical theism, all of which depend on the epistemic character of the agent assessing the evidence 
of suffering. 
4. Perspectival Skeptical Theism: Rational Optionality and Epistemic Defeat in the Face of Evil 
It is now time to apply the distinction between evidential and closure of inquiry defeaters, along 
with what we have gleaned from the various ways in which such defeaters might be resolved, to the 
case of skeptical theism and the argument from suffering. Recall the original statement of skeptical 
theism from §1: 
Skeptical Theism (ST): human agents are not reliable when it comes to determining 
whether or not a given instance of suffering (or evil) is gratuitous. 
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There are, it seems to me, two different putative defeaters that skeptical theism might generate 
for a given agent who is entertaining ST. This is due to the fact that there are two different ways to 
explain why human agents are unreliable in the way ST suggests. First, an agent might think that ST 
calls into question the quality of the evidence for gratuitous suffering of which she is in possession.xxvii Second, 
however, an agent might alternatively think that ST undermines her reliability in assessing the evidence she 
has. In other words, skeptical theism, like the earlier case involving the interviewing of medical school 
candidates, includes the potential for two different undercutting defeaters: one aptly described as 
evidential and the other as closure of inquiry. 
So, the case of ST parallels the medical school candidate interviews case, and the parallels are 
these: (a) both cases concern the gathering and assessment of evidence in a particular domain, and (b) 
both cases threaten either an evidential defeater (with, presumably, either partial or full defeating 
power) or a closure of inquiry defeater. Moreover, the variables involved in determining the possible 
rational responses to the putative defeaters involved in the medical school interviews case were not 
variables specific to that case. Rather, they were variables that could in principle apply to any parallel 
instance of epistemic defeat. But the case of ST is a parallel instance of such epistemic defeat. Thus, 
the six rational reactions to the putative defeaters found in the medical school interviews case should 
also be found in the case of ST. 
What do we get when we consider the six different types of rational reactions involved in the 
case of ST? We again have the following possibilities: (1) denying admission to ST as a defeater full 
stop or acquiring ST as…(2) a partially undercutting evidential defeater, (3) a fully undercutting 
evidential defeater, (4) a closure of inquiry defeater, (5) both a partially undercutting evidential defeater 
and a closure of inquiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a closure of inquiry 
defeater. 
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Let us consider the upshot of this theory of defeat, then, for ST. According to option 1, it can 
be rational for someone to dismiss ST entirely. That is, in some cases, this employment of ST allows 
that someone can rationally endorse premise 2 of the argument from suffering after entertaining the 
possibility of ST (i.e. as in option 1). However, this employment of ST also allows that someone might 
be forced, on pain of rationality, to entirely withdraw belief in premise 2 (i.e. as in options 3, 4, 5, and 
6). This is true of the final three options because of the presence of closure of inquiry defeat, which 
prohibits reasonable belief, even in the face of very strong evidence. Furthermore, this is true in the 
case of option 3 in virtue of the fact that one’s seemings as of gratuitous suffering are (or, at least, very 
likely are) the most significant source of evidence that there is gratuitous suffering. It follows from this that 
if that evidence is fully undermined and we assume that no other source of such evidence is in play, 
then one will possess no evidence in favor of the existence of gratuitous suffering.xxviii Thus, it seems 
quite unlikely that someone finding themselves characterized by option 3 would be in an epistemically 
favorable position with respect to affirming that gratuitous suffering exists. When it comes to option 2, 
whether or not an agent remains on-balance justified in affirming that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e. after 
entertaining and resolving ST as a partially undercutting evidential defeater) depends on the degree of 
recalibration required by that agent’s noetic system and the other epistemic standards by which she 
can be represented (e.g. epistemic risk profile, epistemic self-trust, etc.). Such an agent might be 
rational in retaining a belief that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e. a belief in premise 2), but to know whether 
this is the case requires us to know more about that agent. In other words, mere knowledge of the 
propositions composing that agent’s evidence will be insufficient to further know whether that agent 
is justified in affirming that gratuitous suffering exists. 
5. Reflection on the Benefits of Perspectival Skeptical Theism 
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The preceding story concerning how the epistemic defeater(s) involved in ST might rationally 
play out constitutes what I have been calling perspectival skeptical theism. Before concluding, it is worth 
briefly reflecting on why someone might be inclined to adopt perspectival skeptical theism over the more 
traditional variants of ST. Consider the following from a hypothetical objector. 
Objection Okay, so the idea of perspectival skeptical theism is that there is this special type of defeater 
(i.e. a closure of inquiry defeater) that someone might acquire for the proposition that there are gratuitous 
evils. Why might someone acquire this defeater? Well, they might do so in virtue of the sorts of 
considerations routinely given in support of ST (e.g. non-representativeness of evidence, analogical 
reasoning, etc.). In that case, then, what’s so remarkable about this special closure of inquiry defeater? 
The answer seems to be that closure of inquiry defeaters, once acquired, prevent an agent from reasonably 
believing the proposition the evidential support of which has been called into question by the defeater. 
Indeed, even if the degree of evidential support is very high between the agent’s evidence and target 
proposition, reasonable belief is still undermined. If this is right (and it is), then here’s my worry: this 
is a strange version of ST because it seems to imply that the atheist wins the day. Evidential arguments 
from suffering typically only aim to establish that atheism is probable. But perspectival skeptical theism 
seems to imply that even if ST is true, atheism may remain probable! As a result, closure of inquiry defeat 
seems to add little or no support to the skeptical theist’s aims.xxix 
Reply There are several things to say in response to this objection. First, the last sentence of 
the objection presupposes that skeptical theists have some sort of common goal. Perhaps this type of 
objector assumes that all skeptical theists are theists (a reasonable mistake given the misleading name 
with which the position has been christened).xxx If that were true, then perhaps the common goal of 
all skeptical theists could reasonably be identified as the apologetic task of defending theism against 
all possibility of attack. But this goal is not my goal. I am interested in the argument and a proper 
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understanding of the mechanics of epistemic defeat involved when assessing the argument from the 
first-person perspective. Thus, if the perspectivalist construal of epistemic defeat is correct and if the 
objector is right that perspectival skeptical theism allows atheism to win the day, then I am satisfied. For 
in that scenario, we have a better understanding of the argument as well as the proper place for ST 
(i.e. even if theism is undermined). 
Even so, is it really correct to characterize someone in possession of a closure of inquiry defeater 
as “winning the day”, even if their evidence continues to support some target proposition (e.g. that 
there are gratuitous evils)? Perspectival skeptical theism contends that in addition to sufficient supporting 
evidence for a proposition, someone can “win the day” only if their evidence is not undermined by a 
closure of inquiry defeater which calls into question the reliability of that evidence or the agent’s 
evaluation of the evidence. To say that someone in this situation has “won the day” seems odd, to say 
the least. Witness the following sorts of bizarre conclusions as parodies of this sort of objection: 
Pink elephants probably exist. I see them everywhere! Granted, I took a hallucinogen 
this morning, so my evidence is probably systemically misleading. Nevertheless, I am 
glad to know my argument from I see a bunch of pink elephants to the claim that they 
probably exist is supported by my evidence. 
Polly is probably the best medical school candidate. After all, she nailed the personal 
interview! Now, I know that those empirical studies strongly undermine the reliability 
of my intuitions based on that interview, so I won’t conclude that Polly is the best 
candidate. In fact, it would be an epistemic mistake. That is, it would be unreasonable. 
Nevertheless, I am glad to know that she is probably the best candidate based on my 
(probably unreliable) evidence. 
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Is Alex guilty of murder? Well, all the evidence seems to point that way, so he’s 
probably guilty. Of course, Alex’s defense attorney made a pretty strong case that Alex 
had been framed, in which case the evidence strongly supports his guilt in a 
fundamentally misleading way. But at least we know he’s guilty on the basis of this 
potentially misleading evidence. Perhaps that’s all we on the jury should care about. 
Suppose that the above examples characterize the epistemic situation of someone assessing 
the merit of the argument from suffering. If so, then I contend that they have further work to do. For 
the fact that atheism is probable on their evidence doesn’t seem significant enough to render “winning 
the day” an apt description of them. Or to put it another way, “winning the day” is an apt description 
of them only if it is also an apt description of the three agents described in the three above examples. 
Unfortunately for the objector, it’s clearly not.   
Having set aside the above objection, then, are there any positive reasons for endorsing 
perspectival skeptical theism? That is, does it have any significant advantages over other forms of ST? 
Indeed, there are several advantages. First, philosophers residing on both sides of the 
theistic/atheistic divide understand the strong inclination to believe both of the following 
propositions; namely, (i) that events like the Holocaust very strongly seem to include gratuitous 
suffering and (ii) human agents are not reliably able to track all the possible goods, evils, and entailment 
relations between them, the tracking of which is needed to determine whether an evil is gratuitous.xxxi 
Any account of rationality should, I think, be able to explain the intuitive pull of these propositions 
while also allowing that an agent might reject one or the other intuition without giving up their claim 
to rationality. That is, a strong intuition in support of epistemic permissivismxxxii characterizes this 
debate, and Perspectival Skeptical Theism provides the epistemic foundations for preserving it. 
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Second, although Perspectival Skeptical Theism allows that someone might be reflectively rational 
in dismissing ST as a defeater in its entirety—and thereby leaves the argument from suffering rationally 
compelling for at least some possible agents—it also makes affirming the argument from suffering more difficult. 
Many philosophers either explicitly or implicitly betray a tendency to assume that the weighing of 
evidence is all that fundamentally matters when assessing the argument from sufferingxxxiii, but the 
perspectival skeptical theist points out that often other epistemic factors are relevant (e.g. epistemic risk 
profiles, degrees of epistemic self-trust, etc.) to an assessment of the argument. It follows from these 
considerations that even if one determines that the evidence in one’s possession strongly confirms that 
gratuitous suffering exists, one may yet remain unable to reasonably believe the proposition confirmed by 
one’s evidence. That is, until one has gathered sufficient evidence and garnered a sufficient degree of 
epistemic self-trust to render closure of inquiry appropriatexxxiv, belief that there are gratuitous evils will remain 
rationally inappropriate. 
Third, ST has in various places been saddled with concerns that employing skepticism as a 
response to the argument from suffering precludes the further employment of defenses or theodicies 
in response to the same argument. Because it includes the possibility of closure of inquiry defeat, however, 
perspectival skeptical theism offers an interesting way out of these concerns.xxxv 
Suppose that someone, Sandy, acquires a closure of inquiry defeater in virtue of having a 
particular degree of epistemic risk aversion. That is, suppose that Sandy, as a matter of policy when 
considering subjects insufficiently relevant to everyday life, refuses to affirm a proposition unless she 
assigns a credence of at least .95 to the proposition. Let the proposition in question be there are gratuitous 
evils. Prior to considering theodical arguments, Sandy assigns a credence of .96 to there are gratuitous evils. 
Because of her policy of affirming propositions with a credence of at least .95, she affirms there are 
gratuitous evils. Suppose she then considers the free-will defense for the first time, and it seems to her 
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that the probability of there are gratuitous evils given her assessment of the free-will defense becomes .94. 
As a result of considering the free-will defense, the credence she assigns to the proposition that there 
are gratuitous evils has fallen below the egocentrically-determined threshold for reasonable belief. As a 
result, she acquires a closure of inquiry defeater for the reliability of her evidence that there are gratuitous 
evils in a way that is perfectly consistent with considering the impact of defenses and theodicies on the 
evidence of suffering in her possession.xxxvi 
There are other measures by which a philosophical position might be evaluated. Accordingly, 
I do not intend to claim that the three advantages cited above decisively favor perspectival skeptical theism 
over its more traditional rivals. Nevertheless, the advantages cited—i.e. its fit with epistemic 
permissivism, additional requirements for endorsing the argument from suffering, and compatibility 
with assessing the strength of various theodicies—offer a significant change to the thrust of the debate 
and can refocus the discussion of skeptical theism on epistemic foundations which too often go 
critically unexamined. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, I constructed a new form of skeptical theism, perspectival skeptical theism, modeled 
as a combination of a standard skeptical theist’s thesis, ST, with a perspectivalist form of epistemic 
rationality and defeat. After distinguishing between evidential and closure of inquiry defeaters, I 
considered how such defeaters might differently interact with epistemically varied agents. I identified 
six possible rational outcomes of agents faced with putative epistemic undercutting defeat spawning 
from the results of a study conducted on the trustworthiness of medical school interviews as sources 
of evidence for the best future medical school students. Next, I showed how the defeaters emerging 
from the medical school case could be seen as parallel to the defeaters involved in an agent’s 
entertaining of ST. By drawing out the parallels, I arrived at a description of perspectival skeptical theism 
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and briefly reflected on its advantages over alternative interpretations of the epistemic implications of 
ST. Those advantages, though not alone decisive, demonstrate that perspectival skeptical theism both holds 
much promise as a way of progressing the quality of debate surrounding the argument from suffering 
and deserves more attention moving forward.  
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i See, for instance, (i) Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look” and (ii) Draper and Dougherty, 
“Explanation and the Problem of Evil”. 
ii After all, what’s not to like about arguing something by citing evidence? 
iii I use ‘evidentialist’ broadly here to include those who think that fit with evidence is at least a necessary condition of 
rational/justified belief. By ‘merely evidentialist’, then, I refer to anyone who thinks non-evidential factors are irrelevant 
considerations in the particular case of the argument from suffering, such that in the context of that discussion, fit with 
evidence is necessary and sufficient for believing in the existence of gratuitous suffering. See Dougherty and Tweedt, 
“Religious Epistemology,” 552 where they discuss my use of ‘evidentialist’ under the label of ‘Epistemic Evidentialism’. 
For a nice discussion of the various disputes amongst evidentialists concerning how best to construe their view, see the 
introduction to Dougherty, Evidentialism and Its Discontents. 
iv Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat”. 
v See, for instance, the approach taken in Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil. 
vi See Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. This principle is also quoted in Rutledge, “Commonsense,” 18. 
vii Let the ‘evidential support relation’ simply name the relation that holds between e and p. That is, let it name the is-
evidence-for relation. Notice that in the case of dPartial, e and p continue to instantiate the is-evidence-for relation, but the 
degree of evidential strength is diminished by the defeater. As I conceive of this, there is but one epistemic support relation 
that admits of degrees in the same way that a single relation of love might admit of degrees.  
viii Rutledge, “Commonsense,” 22. I ignore rebutting defeaters in this presentation since they are orthogonal to the 
discussion of skeptical theism. 
ix Rutledge, “Commonsense,” 24. 
x The name ‘closure of inquiry’ might mislead someone into thinking that such defeaters themselves close off inquiry. This 
is mistaken, for such defeaters make closure of inquiry no longer reasonable. In other words, their presence opens up (or 
reopens) inquiry rather than closing it off. Thanks for an anonymous referee who suggested the need for clarification. 
xi One discerning and anonymous referee has drawn my attention to a combination of a particular theory of evidence and 
a theory of evidential support that would prevent closure of inquiry defeaters from being non-evidential, even if they are 
not clearly the same thing as a typical run-of-the-mill undercutter. Suppose that one takes all evidence to be non-factive 
mental states (e.g. beliefs), which, following Kevin McCain, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (New York: Routledge 
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Publishing, 2014): ch. 2, we call ‘psychologism’. Then suppose we understand evidential support in terms of something akin 
to proper function such that belief A supports B to a degree within the interval <x, y> if were S to believe A then S would 
believe B to a degree within the interval <x, y> (see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993): 167-168 for a way of defining the normative component of conditional epistemic probability along the lines 
I give here for epistemic support). On this combination of views, closure of inquiry defeat reduces to a form of evidential 
defeat. In this paper I presuppose a propositional account of the ontology of evidence, and on such a view, no such 
reduction occurs. See Timothy Williams, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Jonathan 
Kvanvig, “Propositionalism and McCain’s Evidentialism,” in Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on 
Evidentialism, ed. Kevin McCain, Synthese Library, (New York: Springer Publications, 2018): 345-357 for defenses of the 
position I assume here. 
xii More on closure of inquiry defeaters can be found in (i) Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, 115-116 & (ii) Kvanvig, 
“Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.” 
xiii Cf. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow. 
xiv See Dawes, House of Cards for a discussion of these and other similar studies. 
xv Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, 55-6. 
xvi The actual goal of medical schools is, hopefully, much more complicated than what I’ve stated here. However, these 
complications are irrelevant to the example as I am employing it, so I ignore them throughout. 
xvii Caveat: someone might think that significant self-monitoring might allow an interviewer to reasonably continue to 
count her intuitions concerning candidates as evidence of future success. Foley, Intellectual Trust, 63-76 offers some helpful 
reflections on why this is unlikely. However, we can avoid a digression regarding the impossibility of self-monitoring by 
simply stipulating it in this case. 
xviii And of course, after reflecting on these empirical studies we might come to think that both of these defeaters are true, 
in which case, both our reliability in gathering and assessing evidence and the evidence itself will be undermined. 
xix See, for instance, (i) Wayne D. Riggs, “Balancing Our Epistemic Goals; (ii) Wayne D. Riggs, “Epistemic Risk and 
Relativism”; and (iii) Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, chapter 5. 
xx For the best work on the notion and import of epistemic self-trust, see (i) Foley, Intellectual Trust and (ii) Zagzebski, 
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. 
xxi Someone might worry about ever justifying such a belief, but since we’re dealing with a stipulated example, let us 
suppose that God has infallibly communicated this proposition to me. 
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xxii Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts”, 223-225 and further discussion of defeater-deflectors in Andrew Moon, 
“Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature,” 210-212. The difference between a defeater-defeater and 
defeater-deflector is this: in the former case, there is a belief that has functioned as a defeater which is itself the object of 
defeat by some new belief. In the latter, defeater-deflector case, the proposition doing the deflecting prevents a defeater 
from arising in the first place. 
xxiii It is worth noting that even if I do have what could be a defeater-deflector, I might trust that deflector-belief less than 
I trust the putative defeater (perhaps due to the source of the defeater). Thus, the presence of beliefs that are structurally 
defeater-deflectors does not prevent defeat in every case. The point, however, is that sometimes such beliefs do prevent 
defeater admission, and sometimes they do so in accordance with reflective rationality. 
xxiv Although, I should flag that in the end, we actually have six such cases because of the possibility that someone might 
not admit the putative defeaters into their noetic state to begin with. 
xxv Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted A. 
Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 120 fn. 9. Quoted in Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, 140 to illustrate 
a similar point concerning rationality. 
xxvi Lest a reader object to this presentation of six options with a worry of the form, “what about option x?”, for the 
purposes of this essay I am not committing to any claim that the six options given are exhaustive of the possibilities. 
xxvii It is worth keeping in mind that, with respect to our agent’s evidence gathering practices, she might not be doing 
anything epistemically wrong in gathering evidence. She might simply be stuck in a situation with respect to the evidence 
of gratuitous suffering analogous to the situation facing the denizens of evil demon worlds. That is, she might gather 
evidence perfectly well. The problem will merely lie in the fact that all the evidence she responsibly gathers is fundamentally 
misleading. That is, in such situations it is the evidence that is the problem rather than the agent. 
xxviii Of course, one might, for instance, have a friend who is one’s epistemic superior and is also supremely trustworthy. 
Perhaps that friend also finds the evidential argument from evil compelling and provides testimonial evidence. In that case, 
the particular evidential support relation targeted by ST would not affect all the relevant evidence since some of the relevant 
evidence is testimonial (i.e. not gathered from attending to one’s seemings). I bracket out this and similar sources of 
evidence in subsequent discussion. 
xxix I owe this objection to an anonymous referee. Indeed, I have met this objection independently on a number of 
occasions, which is why I am addressing it in the main text.  
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xxx The unfortunate-naming observation of skeptical theism has been made by others. See, for instance, Daniel Howard-
Snyder, “Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 
2, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 17-18. 
xxxi This is akin to the construal of skeptical theism found in Michael Bergmann’s version of skeptical theism. See, for 
instance, Bergmann, “Commonsense Sceptical Theism”, 11-12. 
xxxii For an excellent and brief recent discussion of permissivism, see Elizabeth Grace Jackson, “Belief and Credence: Why 
the Attitude-type Matters,” Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). 
xxxiii See for instance, (i) Matheson, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism”; (ii) Dougherty, “ Phenomenal 
Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning”; (iii) Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential 
Arguments from Suffering,” 148; (iv) Van Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of 
Silence,” 163, 171; and (v) Bergmann, “Commonsense,” 23-24. 
xxxiv Rutledge, “Commonsense,” 25-30.  
xxxv See also Michael Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 37-40 for a way of thinking about how traditional forms of ST 
might allow for considering the merits of theodicies or defenses. 
xxxvi Similar points could be made to explain how the employment of natural theology might be compatible with 
perspectivalist forms of ST. See, for instance, Wilks, “The Global Skepticism Objection to Skeptical Theism,” 460, who 
articulates the worry that ST and natural theology do not fit well together: “The [skeptical theist] rationale that discounts 
the problem of evil should be applied with equal force to any form of the design argument which appeals to the presence 
of goods.” 
